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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine a start-up brewery located in Maine that wants to grow its business
by introducing a specific beer into markets in the southwestern United States.
The brewery must deliver the freshest product possible to consumers, which
requires the beer to be brewed, bottled, and distributed from within the region.
Currently, the brewery has no facilities outside of Maine, so its owners decide
the best approach to establishing a market presence in the Southwest is to
license the brewery's recipe, along with its trademarked brand, to a Texas-based
bottling and distribution company. The distributor brews the recipe, brands
and packages bottles with the Maine brewery's label, and distributes the beer
throughout the southwestern United States. The companies agree to a set
monthly fee for the distributor's services, directing all of the sales revenue back
to Maine. The contract includes a clause allowing the distributor to continue
brewing, labeling, and selling the beer to recoup missed payments in the event
that the brewery defaults on a monthly installment by retaining sufficient
revenue.
The beer is well-received in the Southwest, and the brewery contract
accounts for eighty percent of the distributor's total production. Unfortunately,
the brewery over-leveraged itself by aggressively expanding throughout Canada;
after missing several monthly payments, the brewery files for bankruptcy. Per
the contractual agreement, the distributor continues selling the popular beer and
retains sufficient profits to cover the monthly payments. A large international
brewing company, which already owns manufacturing and distributing facilities
across the United States, subsequently buys all of the Maine brewery's assets
through a bankruptcy auction. The new owners obtain a court injunction that
prohibits the Texas distributor from selling any additional beer bearing its
newly-acquired trademark, despite the agreement made with the original
brewery. The international distributor makes tremendous profits selling the
beer, while the original distributor is stuck with a warehouse of spoiling
inventory that a court has forbidden it to sell and accounts receivable that a
court has forbidden it to collect. The effect of the injunction threatens the
continued vitality of the distributor.
The described hypothetical illustrates several equitable dilemmas. How can
this result be fair, when the original agreement clearly allowed the distributor to
recoup delinquent payments by keeping sales revenue? Why does the court
allow the asset purchaser to prevent the distributor from exercising its
contractual rights? Why is there no statutory protection for trademark licensees
whose businesses depend on one or few contracts? The outcome of the
hypothetical is not "fair" to the distributor, but the principles of equity and
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Resolving the disparaging
fairness alone will not resolve this problem.
treatment toward trademark licensees also requires thoughtful consideration of
Bankruptcy Code provisions, statutory interpretation, congressional intent, and
traditional contract law.
First, one must examine the Bankruptcy Code's specific provisions
describing post-rejection rights retained by intellectual property licensees.
These licensees retain their bargained-for rights for specifically listed forms of
intellectual property.' Trademarks, however, are excluded from the Code's
definition of "intellectual property." 2 Trademark exclusion from specific
statutory protection has subjected trademark licensees to harsh judgments over
the past three decades. 3
Part II of this Note examines the treatment of trademark licensees under the
Bankruptcy Code. Relevant intellectual property law, trademark law, licensing
expansion, the Bankruptcy Code, cases, and developments in this dynamic area
of trademark law are discussed. Part III of this Note analyzes the pros and
cons of each viable, yet conflicting solution offered by courts of appeals. Part
III concludes by discussing why the contract analysis provided in the 2012
4
Seventh Circuit decision, Sunbeam Products, Inc. V. ChicagoAmeican Manufacturing,
is the most suitable long-term solution, absent statutory modification.
II. BACKGROUND
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OVERVIEW

Intellectual property (IP) law is a body of principles and doctrines that
creates rights in intangible property5 Many forms of American intellectual
"[Congress may make
property law have roots in the Constitution.
laws] .. . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective

I Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1987, 11 U.S.C. % 101(35A), 365(n)
(2006).
2 Id.
3 See In re Old Carco, LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re HQ Global
Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software
Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 280 B.R. 660, 669-75 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (rejection
deprived the non-debtor party of the right to use trademarks pursuant to Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v.
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985)).
4 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012).
5 DAN

HUNTER, THE OXFORD INTRODUcTIONS TO U.S. LAw: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1

(Dennis Patterson ed., 2012).
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Writings and Discoveries . . . ."6 Although the drafters of the Constitution
specifically addressed copyrights and patents, intellectual property law has since
expanded to address unfair competition and to include protection for
trademarks, trade secrets, and trade dress. 7
IP law balances the interests of promoting art and innovation and providing
consumer protection with respect to the quality and integrity of goods.8 Legal
protection includes the exclusionary right of the owner to regulate or prohibit
the use or sale of protected property and a right to sue those who
misappropriate protected property.9 Legal protection of intellectual property
encourages innovation by rewarding those who invest time and money, as legal
protection lends value to innovation in a market economy. 0 An important
distinction between IP rights and tangible property rights is the duration of
protection. Tangible property rights last as long as someone physically
possesses an item, but IP rights are statutorily limited in order to encourage
innovation and ideas that build off of previous concepts and technology."
B. TRADEMARK LAW OVERVIEW

A trademark is any word, name, symbol, device, or any combination thereof
used to identify or distinguish goods and services for consumer purposes.12
Trademarks include slogans, colors, designs, smells, shapes, containers, and
sounds.13 Trademarks are at the heart of sales and advertising as seen in the
market today. Trademarks serve a dual function: to protect consumers from
confusion by signifying uniform quality and to protect businesses from
competitors who attempt to misappropriate their ideas or goods.14 Trademarks

6 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
7 DONALD A. GREGORY, CHARLES W. SABER & JON D. GROSSMAN,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 2 (1994).

INTRODUCTION TO

8 Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Propertj Assets: An Economic Analysis, 22
BERKELEY TECH L.J. 733, 737 (2007) (discussing the former interest being protected through
copyrights and patents, while the latter interest is served through trademarks and unfair
competition law).
9 See id. at 739-41 (discussing the prominent forms of intellectual property and how legal
protection helps make creative works valuable).
10 Id.
11GREGORY, SABER & GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 1.
12 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
13 Christopher P. Bussert, Trademarks-U.S., in THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: A
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR FRANCHISE, BUSINESS AND IP COUNSEL 1, 1-3 (William A. Finkelstein &
James R. Sims III eds., 2005).
14 Bussert, supra note 13, at 4; HUNTER, supra note 5, at 155.
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are protected under state law and also under federal law by the Lanham Act.' 5
This Note concentrates exclusively on federal trademark law.
Trademarks meeting the Lanham Act requirements for federal registration
are granted protection from trademark infringement.16 Trademark owners can
seek damages and injunctions against any person who uses a mark without
permission, confuses consumers by using a mark similar to a protected mark, or
advertises false statements intended to harm another business. 17 Integrity of the
marketplace is accomplished through trademark protection by encouraging
firms to build goodwill with consumers by offering high quality products and
services.' 8
The duration of trademark protection is unlike patent and copyright
protection due to its indefinite nature.19 Protection of a mark or brand lasts
until the owner either abandons the mark, allows infringement of the mark until
the value is completely diluted, or the protected mark becomes generic by
overuse. 20 According to the Lanham Act, a mark is deemed abandoned after its
use in trade has been discontinued with intent not to resume use; three
consecutive years of nonuse serves as prima facie evidence that no intent to
resume use exists. 21 Trademark protection can also be lost if the owner allows
the mark to become a generic name for a good or service by failing to take
measures to prevent unauthorized use. 22 In contrast, federal law limits
protection of utility patents for twenty years,23 design patents for fourteen
25
years, 24 and copyrights for the lifetime of the author plus seventy years.
C. LICENSING AS A METHOD OF TRADEMARK EXPANSION

Trademarks have become valuable assets of corporations, due in part to the
legal protections they afford and the technological improvements that make
15 Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1127 (2006)). Federal trademark protection authority arises from
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
16 Id
17 Id. % 1114, 1125(a).
18 Menell, supra note 8, at 740-41.
19 15 U.S.C. § 1059(a).
20 Id. § 1127.
21 Id
22 Id. See general# GREGORY, SABER & GROSSMAN, supra note 7, at 109-28 (noting that while
abandoning a trademark or allowing a trademark to become generic are the most common ways
to lose protection, other methods of losing trademark enforceability exist).
2 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006).
24 Id § 173.
25 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006).
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monitoring and subsequent enforcement less difficult. For example, Apple,
Google, Microsoft, Wal-Mart, Samsung, and GE are among the nine global
brands with a value of at least $30 billion in 2012.26 The majority of a
trademark's value is derived from the goodwill established by the company
associated with the mark.27 "[A] trademark is simply a symbol of goodwill and
cannot be sold or assigned apart from the goodwill it symbolizes." 28 Trademark
owners are not solely responsible for expanding goodwill. Through licenses,
companies can retain their trademark protection while working with outside
firms to increase brand value.
Licensing is a common method used by trademark owners to expand the
value of trademarks. A licensing agreement grants the licensee permission to
manufacture, use, or sell the trademark owner's intellectual property without
legally infringing on the mark. 29 In order to preserve an interest in the
trademark, the owner must affirmatively exercise control over the mark by
monitoring and controlling the quality of the goods and services sold by the
licensee.30 For example, a trademark owner can "franchise" a mark, a license
that allows the licensee to use one or more of the marks in its business
operations, typically in exchange for a percentage of profit.31 The licensee must
subject himself to the licensor's prescribed format and quality standards for
products or services associated with the licensed mark. 32 For all licenses, the
trademark owner gains royalties from the mark's use without incurring the
26 Brand Prvfiles & Valuations of the World's Top Brands, BRANDIRECrORY, http://brandirectory.
com/league_tables/global-500-2012 (last visited Jan. 6, 2013).
27 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Bankruping Trademarks, 37 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1267, 1274 (2004)
(discussing the value of trademarks and how the law protects mark owners from "those who
poach" the owner's goodwill); Ashley H. Wilkes, Comment, In re Gucci: The Lack of Goodwill In
Matters Regarding Bankrupty, Trademarks, and High Fashion, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 647, 660-62
(2007) ("[The mark itself is merely a device or symbol to represent the goodwill which is the
actual 'property' that the law aims to protect." (citing Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History
of the Concept of Goodwillin Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 564 n.76 (2006))).
28 Topps Co. v. Cadbury Stani S.A.I.C., 526 F.3d 63, 70 (2d Cit. 2008) (citing Topps Co. v.
Cadburg Stani S.A.I.C., 454 F. Supp. 2d 89, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing 15 U.S.C. 5 1060 (2006))).
Selling or assigning a trademark unattached from the goodwill it symbolizes is deemed a
trademark "in gross" and is considered a violation of trademark law. Id at 69-70.
29 Anthony Giaccio, The Effect ofBankrupty on the Licensing ofIntellectualPropertj Rights, 2 ALB. L.J.
Sci. & TECH. 93, 114 (1992).
3o See DARIN P. MCATEE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ANSWER BOOK 2011-2012:

TRADEMARK BASICS 230 (Practising Law Institute, 2011) (discussing the modem common law

rule that allows trademark owners to retain rights by exercising quality control and the suggesting
Lanham Act's endorsement of that rule in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 under the definition of "related
company").
31 Bussert, supra note 13, at 37.
32 Id.
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expenses of producing, marketing, or selling the goods.33 After licensing a
trademark, the owner can expand the trademark into new markets or product
lines, enhancing the goodwill of the mark in a cost-effective manner by utilizing
third-party familiarity and expertise in particular marketplaces or industries. 34
Trademark licensing agreements in both national and global markets facilitate
trademark expansion into new territories and increase goodwill.35
D. QUALITY CONTROL CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH LICENSING
TRADEMARKS

Quality control is an important consideration for trademark licensors; any
decrease in product quality decreases the goodwill connected to a particular
brand, which in turn decreases consumer confidence in purchasing that brand.36
The control asserted by the licensor is exercised not over the licensee's actual
day-to-day business but instead over the licensee's usage of the mark to the
extent reasonably necessary to ensure consumer confidence.37 Quality control
and consumer confidence are not the only two concerns associated with
trademark licensing. From the licensee's perspective, it is risky to have
profitability contingent upon the strength of a particular licensor's business
model and the corresponding goodwill associated with its trademarks.38 This
risk is particularly relevant when entering into agreements with financiallytroubled licensors because the licensee's rights to use the trademark can become
a problem if the licensor files for bankruptcy.39 This intersection of trademark
33 Nguyen, supra note 27, at 1276.
34 Id. at 1275-79 (explaining that the primary example of expanding trademark use is the
internet, where larger companies commonly use third parties to facilitate the demand of a global
marketplace).
35 Id.
36 DAVID R. GERK & JOHN M. FLEMING, NEW PRACTITIONER's GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY 178 (ABA Publ'g 2012).
37 SHELDON W. HALPERN, CRAIG AILEN NARD & KENNETH L. PORT, FUNDAMENTALS OF
UNITED STATES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw: COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK 351 (3d ed.

2011); seealso Laura D. Steele, Comment, Actual or Hypothetical. Determining the Proper Test for
Trademark Licensee Rights in Bankruptiy, 14 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 411, 417 (2010)
(explaining that courts previously required licensors to exercise stringent control in order to retain
rights to the mark, but recently, courts have eased the requirements of due diligence in
supervising licensees because of the growing importance of trademarks in the modern economy).
38 Richard M. Cieri & Michelle M. Morgan, Licensing Intellectual Propery and Technology from the
Finanaially-Troubled or Startup Company: Prebankrupty Strategies to MinimiZe the Risk in a licensee's
IntellectualPropery and Technology Investment, 55 Bus. LAW. 1649, 1651 (2000).
39 See Alexander Papaefthimiou, Protecting a Trademark licensee's Rights frm Rejection in the
Licensor's Bankrupty Proceedings, 19 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 220, 222 (2010) (discussing ways
licensees can mitigate adverse effects of a bankrupt licensor); Wilkes, supra note 27, at 661-62.
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and bankruptcy law has been problematic for courts, recently leading to a circuit
split.
E. BANKRUPTCY LAW, EXECUTORY AGREEMENTS, AND FIDUCIARY REJECTION
OF AGREEMENTS

Bankruptcy law has three general objectives: (1) give debtors time to assess
their situation and reevaluate the business, (2) provide an equitable method of
sharing the debtor's assets among creditors, and (3) give debtors a "fresh start"
by discharging their previous financial obligations.4o
Like congressional
authority over intellectual property, Congress's power to enact and oversee
bankruptcy procedures in the United States is derived from the Constitution. 41
Failing companies typically initiate bankruptcy filings on their own behalf, but
creditors may have the ability to force a debtor into bankruptcy. 42 Filing a
bankruptcy petition is important for two reasons: first, filing immediately
creates a "bankruptcy estate";43 second, the filing initiates an "automatic stay"
that preserves the estate and enjoins creditors from harassing the debtor or
attempting collection of debt.44
A debtor, for purposes of this Note, may file bankruptcy petitions under
either Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 45 A Chapter 7 filing
consists of ceasing business operations, liquidating assets, and dividing them
among creditors according to priority. 46 A Chapter 11 filing requires debtors to
reorganize and restructure their business, allowing continued operation and use
of property of the bankruptcy estate pending court approval of the
reorganization plan. 47 During Chapter 7 proceedings and certain Chapter 11
proceedings, the court will appoint or approve a third-party "trustee" to be the
fiduciary representative of the bankruptcy estate.48 Typically in Chapter 11
40 STEVEN H. RiTrMASTER, THE SURETY AND BANKRUYTCY 4 (. Blake Wilcox et al. eds., 2010).
§ 8, cl. 4 ("[Congress may make laws] ... [t]o establish a[] uniform Rule
of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States....").
42 Menell, supra note 8, at 751-52.
43 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (including all current assets and future property interests owned by
the debtor within the bankruptcy estate); but see id. § 541(b) (listing exceptions when filing does
not operate as an automatic stay).
4 Id. § 362.
45 Menell, supra note 8, at 752-53.
46 11 U.S.C. %§721-727.
47 Id §§ 1101-1129.
48 Id. § 701, 1104; see also Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptiy: Understanding
'Reection,' 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 851-54 (1988) (discussing the difference between when a
third-party trustee is necessary under Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings).
41 U.S. CONsT. art. 1,

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2013

9

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [2013], Art. 4

356

J. INTELL PROP.L

[Vol. 20:347

proceedings, the debtor becomes the estate's fiduciary, or "debtor-inpossession," and continues to manage its assets unless the court chooses to
appoint a third-party trustee to the estate, usually due to fraud or
mismanagement of the business.49
Regardless of whether a debtor-in-possession or a trustee represents the
bankruptcy estate, an important fiduciary duty is to "assume or reject any
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor."50 An executory contract
is not statutorily defined but is essentially any contract with outstanding
obligations by both parties. 51 Executory contracts can be viewed as both an
asset and an obligation of the debtor; thus, the trustee must decide if continuing
the contract will increase or diminish the bankruptcy estate's value. 52 The
trustee must consider the benefit to the estate, the effect on creditors, and the
potential future liability associated with accepting and continuing operations
under the contract terms.53 If the trustee decides to reject the executory
contract, the non-debtor party no longer has an obligation to perform duties
under that agreement 4 and has a claim for damages, 5 which places the nondebtor among the unsecured creditors to the bankruptcy estate.56 Nearly every
IP license will have sufficiently unperformed obligations by the licensee and
licensor to be considered "executory" because of the continuous duty to pay
royalties and monitor quality.57 However, an intellectual property license will
49 11 U.S.C. % 1104-1108 (2006); Andrew, supra note 48, at 854; Menell, supra note 8, at 753.
5o 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006).
s1 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankrpty: Part1, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973)
(discussing a widely accepted definition of an "executory contract": "[a] contract under which the
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that
the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the
performance of the other."); see also Steve Jakubowski, Treatment ofIP Licenses in Bankrmpty, 1036
PLI/Pat 153, 159-60 (April 2011) (discussing the Countryman definition and other definitions);
Andrew, supranote 48, at 889-95.
52 In rn Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1099 (2d Cit. 1993) ("[A] bankruptcy court
reviewing a trustee's or debtor-in-possession's decision to assume or reject an executory contract
should examine a contract and the surrounding circumstances and apply its best 'business
judgment' to determine if it would be beneficial or burdensome to the estate to assume it.'.
s3 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006); Jakubowski, supra note 51, at 165.
54 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006); Andrew, supra note 48, at 892-93.

ss 11 U.S.C. %9501-502 (2006); see Jakubowski, supra note 51, at 166-67 (citing 3 COLLIER ON
BANKRupTcy 365.09 (15th ed. 2006)) ("Contract rejection, because it is only deemed a breach,
does not affect the parties' substantive rights under the contract, such as . . . damages for
breach .... ').
56 Andrew, supranote 48, at 878 ('The [purpose of the breach] is to insure that the non-debtor
party to the contract will have rights equivalent to those of other parties who are otherwise
similarly situated.").
s7 Jakubowski, supra note 51, at 160.
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not be considered executory "simply because [one] party is obligated to make
payments of money to the other party,"58 if the party receiving royalties has no
obligation in return.59 With IP licensing emerging as a standard business
practice, situations where IP licensors declare bankruptcy, leaving licensees in
precarious financial positions, are not uncommon, and a relatively new body of
law has developed at the intersection of bankruptcy law and IP licensing.60
F. THE INTERSECTION OF BANKRUPTCY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
THE TRADEMARK TREATMENT DISCREPANCY

The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act (IPBPA) is the section
of the Bankruptcy Code that details the treatment of an intellectual property
licensee's rights once the debtor/licensor has rejected an executory agreement. 61
When trustees of the debtor/licensor rejects a licensing agreement, the IPBPA
allows a non-debtor/licensee two options: (1) treat the licensing agreement as
terminated and pursue a claim for contractual breach or (2) retain contractual
rights (excluding specific performance) for the duration of the agreement, as
well as any period during which the licensee can legally extend the agreement. 62
Congress notably excluded trademarks from the definition of "intellectual
property" in the IPBPA, leaving trademark licensees subject to general
bankruptcy standards. 63 Applying the IPBPA can be particularly difficult due to
the conflicting goals of intellectual property law and bankruptcy law.64
Bankruptcy law focuses on successfully rehabilitating debtors by discharging

58 Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cit.
1985).
59 Ron E. Meisler et al., Rejection ofIntellectual Properylicense Agreements Under Section 365(n) oftbe
Bankrupty Code: Still Hazjy AfterAll These Years, 19 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 163, 164 (2010)
("Courts consider RP licenses] to be executory contracts where there are ongoing, material
obligations on both sides, such as the duty to indemnify, pay royalties, maintain confidentiality,
provide updates, or adhere to quality standards.").
60 Menell, supra note 8, at 735-37; Nguyen, supra note 27, at 1271-75.
61 See Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1987, 11 U.S.C. §5 101(35A), 365(n)
(2006) (detailing the forms of intellectual property that excluded from the treatment of general
bankruptcy provisions).
62 Id. § 365(n); see also Giaccio, supra note 29, at 102-03 (discussing the licensee's right of
election mechanism).
63 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2006); S. REP. No. 100-505, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), re inted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204 (discussing the reasons for excluding trademarks from the bill
protection).
64 Giaccio, supra note 29, at 96.
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their debts among a hierarchy of creditors, while IP law focuses on consumer
protection, disseminating ideas, and promoting art and science. 65
In 1988, Congress enacted the IPBPA in response to a 1985 case, 66 Lubriol
Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. 67 Prior to the IPBPA, the
Bankruptcy Code negatively affected licensees in situations where trustees
rejected licensing agreements; upon rejection, licensees could only obtain
monetary damages for breach of contract, typically resulting in recovery of
pennies on the dollar, at best, for unsecured creditors. 68 Many licensees who
relied on particular intellectual property to sustain their business operations were
placed in precarious positions when licenses were rejected because no alternative
suppliers of the IP existed. 69 In 1985, this scenario occurred in Lubri.ol 70
1. Lubrizol Highlights Disparaging Treatment of Intellectual Property Licensing
Agreements in Bankruptcy Proceedings. In 1982, Lubrizol Enterprises (Lubrizol)
entered into a licensing agreement with Richmond Metal Finishers (RMF) to
use RMF's intellectual property, specifically a metal coating technology patent,
in manufacturing Lubrizol's products.7 ' However, before Lubrizol ever actually
used the patented technology, RMF encountered financial difficulties and filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 72 RMF sought to reject the licensing agreement with
Lubrizol as part of its reorganization and reemergence strategy.73 The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with several issues: whether the
licensing contract was executory, thus able to be rejected; 74 whether rejection
would be beneficial to RMF;7 s and if so, whether Lubrizol had any residual
rights in the intellectual property.76
The Fourth Circuit held that each party owed continuing duties to the other
party, the non-performance of which would be considered a material breach of

65 See id. ("The application of the rigid test set forth in § 365(n) frustrates the primary policy
goals of both intellectual property law ... and bankruptcy law. . . ."); see also Menell, supra note 8,
at 738, 751 (discussing the objectives of intellectual property and bankruptcy laws).
- 11 U.S.C. %§101 (35A), 365(n) (2006).

67 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cit. 1985).
68 Giaccio, supra note 29, at 101-02.
69 Id at 102.
70 Lubrigol, 756 F.2d at 1043.
71 Id.at 1045.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id
75 RMF's decision to reject the executory contract was reviewed in light of the business
judgment rule. Id. at 1047.
76 Id. at 1048.
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the agreement, rendering the agreement executory.77 The court determined that
RMF's rejection of the executory contract was advantageous to its bankruptcy
strategy because continuation of the agreement would limit RMF's ability to
"sell or license the technology on more advantageous terms to other potential
licensees."78 Thus, rejection fell within RMF's discretion under the business
judgment rule.79 Finally, the Fourth Circuit found that Lubrizol was not
entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement upon rejection by RMF
but instead was limited to treating the rejection as a contractual breach and
seeking monetary damages based on the application of 11 U.S.C. § 365(g).80
The Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected equitable considerations in bankruptcy
disputes over IP contracts due to the lack of a specific provision in the statute.81
This application of the Bankruptcy Code illustrates the incompatibility of
bankruptcy law goals and IP law goals; granting specific performance-allowing
Lubrizol to continue innovating by expanding upon the licensed technologywould undercut the goals of bankruptcy proceedings-preventing RMF from
efficiently emerging from debt by putting its assets to the most profitable use.82
77

Id. at 1045. The court discussed the standard that the bankruptcy court used, 11 U.S.C.
(an agreement is executory if performance is "due to some extent on both sides"), to
reach its determination that the contract was executory. Id. However, the Fourth Circuit went on
to discuss the "Countryman" standard that it adopted, which more specifically requires that both
parties' nonperformance of their respective continuous duties must materially breach the contract
for it to be considered "executory" as to either party. Id. at 1045-46. RMF had duty to notify
Lubrizol of any patent infringement of any other use or technology license and to indemnify
Lubrizol for losses associated with misrepresentation or breach of warranty. Lubrizol owed the
continuing duty to account for and pay royalties for using the technology, as well as to keep the
technology confidential. Id.

§ 365(a)

78

Id. at 1047.

79

Id. at 1047-48; see also Menell, supra note 8, at n.132 ("Although the business judgment
standard of review is highly deferential, a bankruptcy tribunal may, as a court of equity, restrain a
debtor's rejection of a contract where such an action will needlessly inflict great damage on the
licensee, especially if not accompanied by some countervailing benefit to the estate." (citing In re
Peter U.S.A. Instrument Co., 35 B.R. 561, 563 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983))).
0 Lubriol,756 F.2d at 1048. The court discussed the legislative history behind § 365(g), which
clearly states that "the purpose of the provision is to provide only a damages remedy for the nonbankrupt party." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 349 (1978), rep inted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6305).
81Id. ("[Eiquitable considerations may not be indulged by courts in respect of the type of
contract here in issue."). The court rejected Lubrizol's argument that IP should be treated as real
property, which had a specific statutory provision in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. 5 365(h),
that allowed lessees of real property to retain certain rights and to enforce agreements. Id.
82 Id. at 1048 (noting this holding's "general chilling effect" on parties' willingness to enter into
contracts with businesses that are potentially struggling financially). Ultimately, the court placed
the burden on Congress to change the effect of the Bankruptcy Code provision on "technology
licensees," if it so chooses. Id.
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As a result of the court's decision, Lubrizol, the licensee, lost the right to use
the metal coating process technology patented by RMF and was thrown into
the pool of RMF's general unsecured creditors with no guaranteed monetary
recovery.83 This holding imposed minimal obligations on the debtor upon
finding the contract executory and effectively terminated the licensee's right to
use the patent by allowing a rejection of the contract.M The decision to uphold
rejection of the non-exclusive licensing agreement based on the business
judgment standard, coupled with the rationale that the agreement inhibited
RMF's ability to achieve maximum benefit from licensing the technology,
created the potential for a negative impact on the willingness of companies to
85
enter into IP licensing agreements in the future.
2. Congress's Incomplete Response to the IntellectualProperty licensing Problem Creates
More Uncertainty For Trademark Licensees. Lubriol set the stage for Congress to
assess treatment of IP licensees in bankruptcy proceedings. 86 In 1988, Congress
amended the Bankruptcy Code to include protection for licensees' IP rights by
adding two new sections.87 Section 101(35A) defines the term "intellectual
property," and § 365(n) provides a mechanism for licensees to elect retention of
certain rights when a licensing agreement is rejected by a trustee or debtor-inpossession.88 These additions countered Lubrizol harsh result by reassuring
89
licensees that certain rights would not be forfeited upon the debtor's rejection.
When a licensor elects to reject an executory agreement, 5 365(n) provides
licensees with two options: (1) treat the contract as terminated, if the contract
would be considered terminated under non-bankruptcy law (treat as a breach
and seek monetary damages) or (2) retain the right to enforce any exclusivity
provision of the agreement, if such rights are granted in the language of the
agreement (enforce clauses requiring specific performance as to use of the IP).90
83

Id.; see Giaccio, supranote 29, at 102 (citing 11 U.S.C. %502, 504 (1988)).

Lubriol, 756 F.2d at 1048; see Richard Lieb, The Interrelationsht) of Trademark Law and
Bankrupty Law, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 36-37 (1990) (describing the court's approach and arguing
that trademark rights should not be revoked upon rejection of the agreement).
85 See Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048 ("Lubrizol cannot rely on provisions within its agreement with
RMF for continued use of the technology ... upon breach by RMF."); see also Giaccio, supra note
29, at 101-02 (discussing contract language having no effect on the rights of parties in
bankruptcy).
8 See Nguyen, supra note 27, at 1289 ("Labrizols harsh outcome led to the passage of the
[IPBPA].").
87 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(35A), 365(n) (2006).
88 Id
89 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 9-10 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3206-07; Jonathan
C. Balfus, Exide Inside Out: New Third Circuit Decision Preserves Trademark IJcensee's Rights Followng
Licensor's Ryection Under Bankrupty Code f 365, 31 CAL. BANKR.J. 523, 528-29 (2010).
90 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1)(A)-(B) (2006).
8
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This change circumvents harsh judgments, as in Lubri.ol, in situations where
licensees contract to retain rights in bankruptcy and instead allows licensees to
continue using the IP in their own operations.9' Allowing licensees to retain
contractual rights to licensed IP does not undermine the goals of bankruptcy
because the debtor will continue receiving royalty payments needed to
reimburse creditors. 92 This statutory addition also eliminated the licensee's fear
of getting the "short end of the stick" during bankruptcy, thereby encouraging
parties to use licensing agreements as a method of innovation and brand
expansion.93
One critical problem arising from the language of the IPBPA is found in
5 101(35A), which defines the scope of protection afforded by the retention
mechanism in 5 365(n). 94 IP licenses involving trade secrets, patents, patent
applications, plant varieties, copyrights, and mask works are expressly covered
under § 101(35A).95 However, Congress intentionally omitted several types of
property commonly defined as "intellectual property," such as trademarks, trade
names, and the right of publicity. 96 Congress explained in the Senate Report
that because trademark-licensing relationships depend on the quality control of
products sold by the licensees, such protection was beyond the scope of the
IPBPA until a more extensive study could be performed.97
Until Congress conducts the more extensive study and reexamines
trademark treatment under the IPBPA, trademark licensees remain subject to
the same harsh results demonstrated in the Lubriol holding. However,
Congress specifically expressed hope that bankruptcy courts would develop
"equitable treatment of this situation," pending further legislation.98 To date,

91 See Balfus, supra note 89, at 529 ('The IPBPA ... made clear that licensees were entitled to
retain these rights."); S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), arpintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3203
("[The change to 365] is intended to respond to a particular problem arising out of recent court
decisions . . . .").

92 Giaccio, supra note 29, at 105.
93 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3202 ("Licensing of
technology, which the bill is intended to protect and to facilitate, plays a substantial role in the
process of technological development and innovation.").
94 11 U.S.C. §§101 (35A), 365(n) (2006).
9s Id.; Giaccio, supra note 29, at 106.

9611 U.S.C. § 101 (35A) (2006); S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), uaprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3200, 3204 (discussing the reasons for excluding trademarks from the bill protection).
9 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), rpnintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
98 Id.; Balfus, supra note 89, at 529; Lieb, supra note 84, at 38.
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no evidence suggests that the study alluded to in the Senate Report has taken
place.99
3. The 'Bundle" Problem and the Lack of Equitable Treatment by Courts. Another
issue, known as the "bundle problem," has arisen from Congress's omission of
trademarks from the IPBPA definition. The problem arises in situations where
a licensor grants ancillary rights to trademarks in conjunction with statutorily
mentioned IP rights, such as patents or copyrights.Ioo When a licensee must use
the entire bundle of IP rights in order to continue benefiting from marketing
the product, the lack of trademark protection drastically reduces the value of
the other IP rights to the licensee.101
Several bankruptcy courts have addressed the bundle problem with varying
results. One court suggested that the IPBPA's legislative history should be
invoked to protect licensees in situations where trademark licenses are bundled
03
with other protected intellectual property.102 In In re Matusalem,1 the court did
not actually explain details of the equitable test it would apply in a bundled IP
rights situation because it held against the licensor on business judgment
grounds; nevertheless, the court did allude to the situation being inequitable to
the licensee, as it would "utterly destroy" the licensee's business if trademark
05
rights were not retained.104 The court in In re CenturaSoftware Corp. specifically
addressed the treatment of trademarks bundled with expressly mentioned forms
of IP under § 365(n) and explicitly rejected consideration of legislative history
(equitable treatment of trademark licensees) because of the unambiguous nature
of 5 365(n).10 6 The Centura court distinguished Matusalem by highlighting when
each licensee invoked protection: pre-rejection in Matusalem and post-rejection
in Centura.07 The court left open the possibility of equitable considerations,
depending upon when the licensee invokes protection, rendering unclear
99 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., 686 F.3d 372, 375 (discussing S. REP. No. 100-505,
at 5, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200); Lana Koroleva & Alexander Brougham, Seventh Circuit
Hands Victory to Trademark Licensees, AM. BANKR. INST.J. 52, 53 (2012).
100 See Giaccio, supra note 29, at 107-08 ("A problem arise [sic] when protected rights are
granted in conjunction with rights that are excluded from the definition of intellectual property.");
see also Menell, supranote 8, at 774--76 (discussing bundled IP licenses).
101 See Giaccio, supra note 29, at 107-08 (explaining how the licensee's benefits are greatly
reduced without the entire bundle).
102 In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 522 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
103 Id
104 Id.
105 Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660

(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).
106 Id. at 670; see also S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204
(discussing the possibility of equitable treatment under the statute).
107 Centura, 281 B.R. at 672 ("What is before the court is only the application of § 365(n).").
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whether the court believed legislative history could ever be used to extend
§ 365(n) protection to trademark licensees.10s
These two opinions cast doubt on whether equitable treatment should be
considered. On one hand, Congress clearly intended courts to treat trademark
cases "equitably," 09 but on the other hand, the statutory language plainly omits
trademarks from the list of exceptions to § 365(a) treatment of executory
contracts. 120 The Centura opinion also left open the possibility for courts to
equitably protect trademarks if the protection is sought pre-rejection but not to
have the ability to weigh the equities after rejection has occurred."' Subsequent
decisions have split on whether to approach § 365 with a view toward the
legislative history or the plain language of the statute. While multiple opinions
have viewed the issue through the plain statutory language lens, leaving the
licensee without any continued use rights,112 one notable concurring opinion
from a Third Circuit case gives an in-depth discussion on legislative intent and
equitable treatment as the preferred analysis for rejected executory trademark
licensing agreements." 3
In In re Exide Technologies,114 Exide filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy and
sought to reject various agreements arising from a 1991 contract with
EnerSys." 5 The agreements licensed Exide's trademark for use in the industrial
battery industry for an up-front fee." 6 The central issue in Exide was whether
the contract was executory," 7 but in a concurring opinion, Judge Ambro
discussed his view of the issues that Matusalem and Centuraleft unresolved." 8
First, Judge Ambro clearly rejected the plain language approach that
deprives trademark licensees of continued use of trademarks under a rejected
executor agreement: "I believe a trademark licensor's rejection of a trademark
agreement .. . does not necessarily deprive the trademark licensee of its rights in

108 Menell, supra note 8, at 777-78 (contrasting Matusalem's more
receptive approach to
equitable treatment from Centura).
109 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.

110 11 U.S.C. § 3 65(n) (2006).

H Centura, 281 B.R. at 671-72.
112 In re Old Carco LLC, 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2009); In re HQ Global Holdings,

Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); Centura Software Cop., 281 B.R. at 674-75 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2002).
113 In re Exide Tech., 607 F.3d 957, 967 (3d Cit. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring).
114 Id. at 957.
"s

Id. at 960.

116 Id. at 961.
117 Id. at 960.
118 Id. at 964-68.
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the licensed mark."1 19 The concurring opinion continued by discussing the
inadequate reasoning in prior trademark license rejection cases, such as LubriZol,
that negatively infer congressional intent from the plaint statutory language and
thus treat rejection as rescission.120 Judge Ambro stated that § 365 freed a
bankrupt licensor from burdensome duties that hindered reorganization but
that courts should not use § 365 to "take back trademark rights [the debtor]
bargained away" because "[t]his makes bankruptcy more a sword than a shield,
putting debtor-licensors in a catbird seat they often do not deserve."l21 Judge
Ambro believed that equitable powers should have been used to give Exide a
fresh start through bankruptcy without stripping the licensee of its fairly
procured IP rights.122
The Third Circuit concurrence provided an interesting new perspective on
the problems created by Lubriol and § 365(n), but because the case was decided
on other grounds, no circuit court had truly taken on the case precedent that
unfavorably treated trademark licensees. The two important takeaways from
Exide are its critical treatment of bankruptcy courts that rely on Lubrigoland its
ratification of the Matusalem court's dicta that equitable treatment should be
considered in trademark license rejection cases. Shortly after Exide, another
circuit court faced the same unresolved issue: whether Lubrikol still applied to a
bankrupt licensor's rejection of trademark agreements.123
4. The Supreme Court's Previous Statutory Interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code.
The methods of statutory interpretation used in Supreme Court precedents are
important for circuit judges to consider when adjudicating issues of trademark
licensee treatment under the Bankruptcy Code. The Supreme Court uses a
variety of rules and canons when interpreting legislation but generally interprets
24
statutes based on their plain meaning.1 These conventions assist the Court in
25
determining whether legislative history should be considered.1 The Supreme
Court has expressed the desire "that Congress be able to legislate against a

119 Id. at 965.

120 Exide, 607 F.3d at 967 (citing Michael T. Andrew, ExecutoU Contracts Revisited, 62 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1, 11 (1991)).
121 Id. at 967-68.
122 Id at 967.

123 See Koroleva & Brougham, supra note 99, at 53 (discussing the Exide court's treatment of
LubriZoland the remaining question of whether Lubrizol was still applicable after § 365(n)).
124 See James Lawniczak, James M. Lawnicgak on Statuto Interpretation in Bankrupty Matters, 2009
EMERGING IssUEs 3542 (explaining the current plain meaning approach to statutory
interpretation used by the Supreme Court).
125 See YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
9
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 1 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-58 .
pdf.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol20/iss2/4

18

Cone: A "Sunbeam" of Hope: The Seventh Circuit's Solution Overcoming Di

2013]

A "SUNBEAM" OF HOPE

365

background of clear interpretative rules, so that it may know the effect of the
language it adopts."l 26 However, statutory interpretation is rarely predictable,
and the Court has a variety of canons at its disposal in order to reach virtually
any desired interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 127
Courts interpret the Bankruptcy Code using the same established principles
of statutory construction employed in other areas of law.128 The initial
determination in bankruptcy statutory interpretation is whether "the plain
language of the Bankruptcy Code disposes of the question before [the
Court]."1 29 When the interpretation of a federal law, such as the Bankruptcy
Code, "turns on a statute and the intention of Congress, [the Court] look[s] first
to the statutory language and then to the legislative history if the statutory
language is unclear." 130 "[Inn interpreting a statute a court should always turn
first to one, cardinal canon before all others.... [C]ourts must presume that a
legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there."1 31 In determining whether a statute is ambiguous, the Court looks to the
statute in its entirety, allowing courts to consider the context of the entire
provision when determining issues in specific sections.132 When the language of
a statute is unambiguous, the "judicial inquiry is complete" after applying this
first canon.'33
Legislative history may be used to resolve determined ambiguities, but only
where
the
history
indicates
"a
'clearly
expressed
legislative
inten[t] . . . contrary. . .' to the plain language of [the Bankruptcy Code]." 34

126Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989), superseded ly statute, Judicial Improvements
Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006), as recogniZedin Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., 545
U.S. 546 (2005).
127 See KiM, supra note 125 ("[Tjhere is some overlap and inconsistency among these rules and
conventions .. .. .
128 See RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012)
("[I]t
is our obligation to interpret the Code... using well established principles of statutory
construction.").
129 Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 160 (1991); see id. at 160-61 (finding the plain language
of
the Code to be controlling even in the face of legislative intent pointing to a contrary
interpretation).
130 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984).
131Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).
132 United Says. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365,
371 (1988)
("Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in
isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme ..... (citing Sorenson v. Sec'y
of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986))).
133 Conn. Nat'lBank, 503 U.S. at 254 (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430
(1981)).
134 Toibb, 501 U.S. at 162 (alteration in original) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)) (discussing situations where legislative history
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Even when the language is not ambiguous, there are "rare cases [in which] the
literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with
the intentions of its drafters." 35 "In such cases, the intention of the drafter,
rather than the strict language, controls."' 3 6
Another relevant canon is expressio unius est exclusio alterius,which functions as
a negative inference against items not included in a statutory list of exceptions
to a general prohibition.' 37 "Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain
exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied,
in the absence of a contrary legislative intent." 3 8 Context is critical when
applying negative inferences, as the canon only has force when the items listed
Only then can an
"are members of an 'associated group or series.' "139
exclusion justify the negative inference that items not mentioned were
deliberately excluded.140 The Court has previously endorsed the use of negative
inferences in the context of § 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.141 The Court
held that 5 365(a) "includes all executory contracts except those expressly
exempted . . . ." 142 Prior to 2011, courts resolved the treatment of trademark
licensees in bankruptcy proceedings as a matter of statutory interpretation, but
an alternative resolution, discussed below, would soon emerge.
5. The Seventh Circuit's Resolution: Sunbeam. In 2011, the Northern District of
Illinois Bankruptcy Court heard a dispute between Lakewood Engineering and
Chicago American Manufacturing (CAM) regarding a licensing agreement to
produce twenty-inch box fans.143 Lakewood outsourced the production of box
fans to CAM in 2008, which included rights to use certain intellectual property,
including the Lakewood trademark.144 In early 2009, Lakewood was the subject

includes conflicting statements preventing that history from being used to interpret ambiguous
statutory language).
135 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (alteration in original) (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
136 Id
137 Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 168 (2003).
138 Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (citing Cont'l Cas. Co. v. United
States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942)).
139 Barnhart,537 U.S. at 168 (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 65 (2002)).
140 Id.

141 See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 521-22 (1984) (extending negative inferences
to collective bargaining agreements based on the language of § 365(a) and 11 U.S.C. S 1167).
142 Id. at 521.

143 Szilagyi v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, (In re Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co.), 459 B.R. 306, 313
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011), afd sub. nom. Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 685 F.3d 372
(7th Cir. 2002).
144 In re Lakewood, 459 B.R. at 313.
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of an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding.145 The agreement between
CAM and Lakewood allowed CAM to sell any inventory that Lakewood could
not purchase and to use any remaining raw materials to make more of the box
fans in order to recoup its out-of-pocket expenses.146 During the agreement
period, CAM produced tens of thousands of fans bearing Lakewood's marks
that Lakewood could not afford to purchase under the terms of the
agreement.147
After Lakewood entered into bankruptcy, CAM began selling the marked
fans to third parties to recoup manufacturing expenses, as stipulated in the
agreement.148 Lakewood planned to reject the agreement with CAM and
auction company assets, including the rights to the Lakewood trademark.149
Lakewood's trustee subsequently rejected the agreement between Lakewood
and CAM and sought to stop CAM from selling Lakewood-branded fans.150
Sunbeam, a company looking to capitalize on Lakewood's financial
struggles, won the auction of Lakewood's assets. 15 ' Fearful of losing the
contractual status quo, CAM objected to the auction, arguing that selling and
manufacturing box fans was not affected by the trustee's rejection of the
original manufacturing agreement.152 The bankruptcy court held that CAM's
license to use Lakewood's trademarks, although not covered under the
Bankruptcy Code, survived rejection of the supply agreement.'5 3 "[T]his court
must make its determination on equitable grounds, and avoid a situation that
'let[s] a licensor take back trademark rights it bargained away.' "154 The court
was persuaded by the argument made by Judge Ambrio in his Exide
concurrence, stating that the reasoning "must give a court pause before it
mechanically follows the line of cases which state that Lubiiol controls on the
effect of rejection of a license to use trademarks." 55 The bankruptcy court
decided to begin the " 'development of equitable treatment' that Congress
anticipated would occur." 56

145
146
147
148
149

Id. at 320.
Id. at 315-16.
Id. at 321-22.
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 323-26.
150 Id. at 323.
151 Id. at 325.
152

Id

153 Id. at 343-46.
154 Id. at 345 (quoting In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 967 (3d Cir. 2010)).
155 Id. at 343.
156 Id. at 345; supranote 98.
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The case was appealed and came before the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals with a new name, Sunbeam. 57 Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook authored
the relatively short opinion, affirming the bankruptcy court's holding that the
rejection of a trademark license does not terminate the licensee's contractual
rights.158 Easterbrook's analysis was unique because he affirmed the lower
court's holding on grounds other than equitable treatment.15 9 The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court's reading of the contract but chose to
further examine the effect of the trustee's rejection on the parties' supply
agreement.16 The Seventh Circuit expressly agreed with the portion of the
Exide holding that negative inferences, from Congress's passage of 5 365(n) and
the omission of trademarks from 5 101(35A), do not codify Lubrikol: "an
omission is just an omission."'61 The court also held that "[tlhe limited
definition [of intellectual property] in § 101(35A) . . . does not affect trademarks
one way or the other."162 The court mentioned the Senate Report's reference to
a subsequent study, stating that "[t]he subject seems to have fallen off the
legislative agenda" but concluding that such lack of re-visitation by Congress
did not codify Lubri.ol'63
After delivering what seemed to be a pro-equitable-treatment discussion of
the law, the Seventh Circuit took a drastic turn. The court discussed a thenrecent Supreme Court opinion, RadLAX, which emphasized that Bankruptcy
Code provisions cannot be superseded by equitable arguments based on the
Code's legislative history or wise public policy.164 The Seventh Circuit
characterized the basis of the bankruptcy court's decision as "untenable" but
not requiring reversal, setting the stage for a new analysis that protects
trademark licensees.165 The court then set out "to determine whether Lubrigol
correctly understood § 365(g), which specifies the consequences of rejection
under 5 365(a)."1 66 The relevant excerpt from § 365( that the court examined

157 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cit. 2012).
158 Id. at 378.
159 Id at 375-76.
16 Id at 375.
161Id. ("Some bankruptcy judges have inferred from the omission that Congress codified
Lubritolwith respect to trademarks, but an omission is just an omission.").
162 Id
163 Id. (discussing S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204);
Koroleva & Brougham, supra note 123, at 53.
164 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376 (citing RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
132 S. Ct. 2065, 2073 (2012)) (assuming that equitable arguments grounded in legislative history
or public policy are not included in "well established principles of statutory construction").
165 Id
166 Id
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is the very first sentence: "[R]ejection of an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract .
6."'7 The court
interpreted this provision to classify a rejection as a breach under the
Bankruptcy Code and established that such a breach is treated the same, inside
or outside of the bankruptcy context.' 68 Specifically, the court analogized to the
licensee's hypothetical rights following a breach under Article II of the Uniform
Commercial Code and argued that 5 365(g)'s treatment of rejection as breach
should establish the same rights in bankruptcy as a breach would establish
outside of bankruptcy, concluding that the non-breaching party's rights
remained in place. 169 The court opinion stated, "nothing about this process
implies that any rights of the other contracting party have been vaporized." 70
The Seventh Circuit bolstered its argument by analogizing a trademark
licensee's rights in rejection to a lessee's rights upon rejection of a lease
agreement.17' The court reasoned that just as a lessor could not end a tenant's
right to possession by reacquiring the premises, a trademark licensor could not
completely rescind the license.172 The court further criticized the Lubigol
court's treatment of rejection as rescission. 173 The court implemented a
contract law analysis as a mechanism to produce equitable results without the
confusion associated with statutory interpretation or the use of equitable
principles.174

Finally, the Seventh Circuit concluded by stating that Lubrikol was not
persuasive and that creating a circuit split was justified based on the lack of
interest from other judges within the circuit to hear the matter en banc.175 The
holding rejected equitable treatment under the Bankruptcy Code, circumvented
an equitable treatment analysis, used § 3 6 5 (g) to treat rejection as breach, and
treated the breach as distinct from avoidance of rights. 176 The Seventh Circuit's
holding represented a clear split from the Fourth Circuit's holding in Librir:ol

167 Id. (quoting 11 U.S.C. 5 365(g) (2006)).
168 Id. at 377.
169 Id
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See Koroleva & Brougham, supra note 123, at 86 ("The court agreed with Judge Hollis's
criticism of Lubriolbut found that her reliance on the bankruptcy court's equitable powers had been
misplaced.... [J]udgment in CAM's favor was appropriate simply as a matter of contract law.").
175 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 378.
176 Id
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and was the court's attempt to move away from the statutory interpretation
debate, toward an alternate basis for finding in favor of trademark licensees.177
III. ANALYSIS
Prior to Sunbeam, resolving which rights were retained by licensees upon
rejection of trademark agreements in bankruptcy appeared to be a choice
between two alternatives: (1) equitable treatment by the bankruptcy court per
legislative intent or (2) affirmation of Lubri:Zols plain meaning assessment of the
Bankruptcy Code. 78 Regardless of the path chosen, the issue appeared to turn
on statutory interpretation. 79 However, a third new solution emerged when
Judge Frank Easterbrook authored the Seventh Circuit's opinion that
circumvented statutory interpretation and based its outcome on contract law. 80
In December 2012, the Supreme Court declined to hear the Sunbeam case.'8'
The Court may, however, eventually return to and resolve the circuit split;
therefore, a careful analysis of each alternative solution's pros and cons should
be considered.
If the Supreme Court does resolve the circuit split, the Court will have at
least three viable options to consider while deciding this case: (1) affirm the
legislative history and equitable treatment line of cases, (2) reject the Sunbeam
analysis and reinstall LubriZol, which plainly interprets the Bankruptcy Code
language, or (3) affirm Sunbeam's contract law analysis. The advantages and
disadvantages of each option are discussed below. Ultimately, if the Supreme
Court grants certiorari on this circuit split in the future, it should affirm the
contract analysis set forth in Sunbeam. Such an affirmation would reach a fair
result without compromising established statutory interpretation precedent.
A. EQUITABLE TREATMENT APPROACH: THE ATTEMPT OF JUDGE AMBRO AND
LAKE WOOD TO FURTHER LEGISLATIVE INTENT

When the IPBPA was passed into law, Congress clearly intended bankruptcy
courts to use equitable treatment when deciding trademark license rejection

177 Id. at 372.
178 See Menell, supra note 8, at 777 ("To a significant degree, the issue boils down to whether the
relatively clear language of the statute-excluding trademarks from the definition of 'intellectual
property'-allows a court to look to the legislative history at all.").
179

Id

1s0

Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377-78.
S. Ct. 790 (2012).

181Id. at 372, cert. denied, 133
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cases. 182 Judge Ambro's concurrence in Exide was the first unambiguous
application of equitable treatment in such a case.183 Ambro's lead was followed
shortly thereafter in Lakewood by an Illinois bankruptcy court that factored
equitable treatment into its analysis for trademark license rejection and allowed
the licensee to retain its right to use the trademark.'8 Lakewood's holding
marked the first time a bankruptcy court used congressional intent to treat
trademark cases equitably as the basis of its holding; however, the decision was
overturned on appeal in the Seventh Circuit and subsequently was denied
review by the Supreme Court.s85 The problem with adopting Lakewoods
equitable treatment holding is that it conflicts with stare decisis.
While equitable treatment of trademark licensees may arguably further
Congress's intent in enacting the IPBPA, statutory interpretation precedent
suggests that such treatment will not be read into the language of the statute.
The Supreme Court prefers a plain meaning approach, which is a reading of the
entire statute and a determination of treatment based on statutory language,
when interpreting statutes.186 If the Court ruled on the issue, it would likely
first turn to the cardinal canon of statutory interpretation, which presumes that
the legislature says what it means in a statute.'87 The Court would then
determine whether the statutory language of § 365(n) or § 101 (35A) contains an
ambiguity in order to read legislative intent into the statute. Finding an
ambiguity would be unlikely because the entire statute is silent on trademarks.
Section 101(35A) lists specific IP licenses in which the licensee may elect to
retain rights under § 365(n), but the list does not mention trademarks.188
Silence can be deemed an ambiguity; however, such a finding is not proper
in this instance because the negative inference suggests, and legislative history
confirms, that Congress intentionally excluded trademarks from protection
under § 365(n).' 89 Section 101(35A) expressly lists exceptions to the general
treatment of executory contracts under § 365(a), and the Court has emphasized:
"[w]here Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general
182S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204 ("[Congress]
determined to postpone congressional action ... to all the development of equitable
treatment ... by the bankruptcy courts.").
183In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 2010).
184 Szilagyi v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC (In re Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co.), 459 B.R. 306 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 2011), affd sub. nom. Sunbeam, 686 F.3d 372 (2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 770.
185 Id.
186See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984) ("[We look first to the statutory language and
then to the legislative history if the statutory language is unclear.").
187 Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
188 11 U.S.C. $§ 101(35A), 365(n) (2006).
189S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
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prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of
evidence of a contrary legislative intent."190 While the "contrary legislative
intent" language suggests an applicable loophole, one must consider exactly
what Congress intended. Congress expressly stated that trademark rejection
was not addressed in the bill because "such contracts raise[d] issues beyond the
scope of th[e] legislation" and therefore "determined to postpone congressional
action in th[e] area . . . ."'91 Congress intended for executory trademark
agreements to fall outside of the list of exceptions in the IPBPA and for
bankruptcy courts to treat the situation equitably.192 Alternatively, a plain
reading of the statute does not extend protection to trademarks, as they are
never mentioned within the Code.193
Supporters of equitable treatment may point to a Supreme Court decision
allowing legislative history to be used as extrinsic evidence when a "literal
application of [the Bankruptcy Code would] produce a result demonstrably at
odds with the intentions of its drafters."1 94 No ambiguity in the plain language
of the IPBPA exists, so considering congressional intent would be both
improper and inconsistent with the principle of stare decisis. Both the LubriZol
court and Congress acknowledged the potential negative effects of not
protecting IP; nevertheless, when drafting the bill to address the problem,
Congress chose neither to extend protection to trademarks nor to mention
trademarks in the statute in light of the fact that future plain meaning
interpretation by courts was probable.195 The canon stating that the Court will
not enforce the plain meaning if enforcement would lead to an "absurd or odd
result" 96 is not likely to trump the plain meaning presumption in this scenario
because of the quality control concerns cited by Congress in excluding
trademarks from the protected forms of IP, as well as the acknowledgement
that trademarks are beyond the scope of the IPBPA. Congress had every
opportunity to include trademark protection, or at the very least to include an
express statutory requirement that trademarks are to be treated equitably, but it
declined to take such steps. Further, in over twenty years since the IPBPA was

19 Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616-17 (1980) (citing Cont' Cas. Co. v. United
States, 314 U.S. 527, 533 (1942)).
191 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprintedin1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
192

Id
193 11 U.S.C. % 101 (35A), 365(n) (2006).

194 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)).
195 11 U.S.C. % 101 (35A), 365(n) (2006).
196 See Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459-61 (1892) (adopting the
"absurd result" canon of statutory construction).
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enacted, Congress has not revisited the issue as courts continually have
effectuated the plain meaning interpretation of the statute.
The lone decision based on legislative intent, Lakewood, was determined by
the Seventh Circuit to be a proper result with an untenable rationale.197 The
licensee deserved protection, and equity favored allowing CAM to retain its
rights under the agreed upon terms; however, the dispute with Lkewoods
holding rests in how the result was achieved. Authored by Judge Easterbrook,
who is known for his statutory interpretation scholarship, the Sunbeam holding
agreed that the trademark licensee deserved protection. Easterbrook likely
realized that legislative intent arguments were not the best mechanisms for
reaching this result and would be unlikely to survive the Supreme Court's
statutory interpretation review. Easterbrook proposed an alternative solution,
discussed in further detail below, that allows courts to consider contract terms
when determining whether rights can be retained after rejection of a trademark
license.
B. LUBRIZOL APPROACH: AN INCONSISTENT STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF
THE BANKRUPTCY CODE

The Lubiol approach interprets the Code in two conflicting ways: the
interpretation is part plain meaning and part legislative intent. The Fourth
Circuit determined that trademark licensees are not protected under the IPBPA
based on the absence of trademarks from the definition of IP.198 Next, the
court discussed Lubrizol's remedies and applied a common law (legislative
intent) reading to another portion of the Bankruptcy Code in denying
Lubrizol's request for specific performance.199
Several bankruptcy court
decisions viewed the subsequently-enacted IPBPA as codifying Libitols
negative inference canon of statutory interpretation, whereby the courts denied
protection to trademarks and other unlisted forms of IP.200 The court in
Lubdfol, while recognizing the strong policy concerns of unfairness in its
holding and the potentially chilling effect on parties reaching IP agreements,
followed through with a plain meaning reading of the pre-IPBPA Bankruptcy
Code, despite the "obvious adverse consequences." 201
Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d 372, 376 (2012).
Lubrizol Enters., Inc. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir.
1985), superseded by statute, Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act of 1987, 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(n) (2006), as recognized in In re Qimonda AG, 470 B.R. 374 (E.D. Va. 2012).
197

198

199 Id. at 1048.
200 See In re Exide, 607 F.3d at 966 (citing multiple cases that for follow LubriZols negative
inference approach).
201Lubrigol, 756 F.2d at 1048.
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Proponents of Lubriol argue that its holding is consistent with statutory
interpretation principles and practices under the Code, as discussed earlier in
this Note, and correctly places the burden on Congress, instead of the courts, to
carve out exceptions to longstanding bankruptcy procedures. Congress has the
ability to alter the text of the statute to explicitly provide for equitable treatment
(or whatever degree of protection it desires) of trademarks, but Congress has
yet to revise the definition of "intellectual property" since enacting the IPBPA
in 1988. While Congress is in the best position to take remedial steps, cases
involving trademark rejection in bankruptcy have been relatively infrequent
since the IPBPA was codified, making it unlikely that Congress will consider the
issue in the near future. Going forward, Congress may be forced to revisit the
statute as trademark licensing becomes more prevalent and more cases are
heard in court.
Another critical aspect of Lubri.ols holding, treating rejection of an
executory agreement as recission, should be explicitly rejected by the Supreme
Court. In LubriZol, the court determined that under § 365(g), the licensee was
able to treat the rejection as a breach but was unable to retain its contractual
rights through specific performance, which would be available outside of the
Bankruptcy Code.202 The court argued, under this portion of their analysis, that
the legislative history clearly limited the available remedies to damages, which
effectively treats rejection as rescission. 203 In reaching this conclusion, the
Fourth Circuit used two contradicting methods of statutory interpretation for
two unambiguous portions of the same statute. The plain language of § 3 65(g)
allows rejection of an executory contract to constitute a breach of the contract
but does not include any limitation of remedies in the statute. 204 The Supreme
Court should decline to accept either position taken by the Fourth Circuit in
Lubri.ol, as the statutory interpretation analysis is unnecessary to resolve the
problem. If the Court does decide to rule based on statutory interpretation,
however, no rationale should deviate from the plain meaning precedent by
reading legislative intent into the unambiguous language of § 3 6 5(g). While the
plain meaning aspect of Lubri.ols holding is unfavorable to licensees and is
unlikely to yield equitable results in many circumstances, it is on more solid legal
ground than is the limited remedy aspect of the holding that abandons the plain
meaning interpretation of the Code. Rejecting Lubri.ol in its entirety does not

202

Id
203Id.; see Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg., LLC, 686 F.3d at 376-77 (discussing
Lubi.ols approach to § 365(g) and why such an approach is a mistake).

w 11 U.S.C. § 365 (g) (2006).
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hinder the application used by the Seventh Circuit, which should also be
adopted by the Supreme Court, as discussed below.
C. SUNBEAM APPROACH: CONTRACT ANALYSIS AS THE BEST SOLUTION

The Supreme Court should adopt the view taken by the Seventh Circuit in
Sunbeam if the Court ever chooses to resolve the circuit split. In Sunbeam, the
Seventh Circuit disagreed with the negative inference rationale; instead, the
court held that the IPBPA is not a codification of LIubriZol with respect to
trademarks and that the omission of trademarks from the IPBPA is "just an
omission." 205 Regarding statutory interpretation, the Sunbeam court argued that
the omission of trademarks from the statutory language has no positive or
negative effect on trademarks, citing Congress's intent to leave trademarks out
of the scope of the bill.206 This approach requires the court to ignore the
expressio unius est exclusion alteriuscanon regarding the definition of IP and to treat
trademarks as outside of the scope of the IPBPA, as Congress desired. 207 The
Court must also be willing to overlook the canon that specific statutes trump
general statutes because the specific IP statute included in the Code supports
the negative inference that trademarks were specifically excluded. The Supreme
Court unpredictably applies interpretative canons, and considering that nearly
every canon has a counter-canon that leads to an opposite interpretation, 208 the
Supreme Court could focus on interpreting the statute in its entirety to support
Easterbrook's contractual remedy basis.
Prior to Sunbeam, no court had explicitly set out to challenge LubriZofs
holding that monetary damages were the only allowable remedies under
365(g).209 The Seventh Circuit correctly challenged existing precedent related
to § 3 6 5 (g) and held that a plain meaning interpretation applies to remedies
upon breach of contract by a debtor-licensor. 210 Judge Easterbrook, who was
well-acquainted with contracts and statutory interpretation, properly determined
that statutory interpretation arguments were not the clearest way to resolve
disparaging treatment to trademark licensees. 211 Like Judge Ambro, the Seventh
205 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375.
206 Id
207 S. REP. No. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204.
208 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theog ofAppellate Decision and the Ruks or Canons About
How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950) ("Hence there are two opposing
canons on almost every point.").
209 LubriolEnters.,Inc., 756 F.2d at 1045.
210 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376.
211 See general# Frank H. Easterbrook, Pragmatism's Role in Interpretation, 31 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 901 (2008); Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copynght, 42 Hous. L. REv. 953 (2005);
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Circuit opines that the Lubrikol court was mistaken in treating rejection like
avoidance under § 365(g).212 Reading the plain language of the statute, the court
correctly determined that a rejection of a trademark agreement under 5 365(g) is
subject to the same contractual remedies, including retention of rights of the
non-breaching party, found outside of the Bankruptcy Code. 213
A potential criticism of the contract analysis solution is the requirement that
licensees carefully draft agreements by including terms to govern the parties'
The burden of drafting more comprehensive
rights under bankruptcy.
agreements that encompass bankruptcy rights will add time and expense to all
parties. However, the burden is best-suited for the contracting parties. The
parties will anticipate their duty to include language governing bankruptcy
rights, and the costs associated with the extra burden will decrease as standard
clauses for trademark licensing agreements emerge. Adopting Sunbeam also
avoids the "chilling effect" that accompanies holdings such as Lubrigols, while
providing certainty that both parties will get what they bargained for and that
no party will be able to take advantage of the Code to gain a windfall, despite
contradicting contractual provisions.
Interpreting 5 365(g) exclusively, while ignoring the other interpretation
issues, is the least troublesome resolution. By following this approach, the
Supreme Court will avoid legislative intent while affording much needed
equitable protection for trademark licensees. By adopting Sunbeam's analysis,
the Court can maintain its plain meaning precedent while allowing licensees to
retain bargained-for protection under trademark agreements. The Court can
provide the best long-term solution by avoiding both Lakewood and Lubrigols
statutory interpretation alternatives and by upholding the Seventh Circuit's
contract analysis as the framework for bankruptcy courts to follow.
IV. CONCLUSION

The goals of bankruptcy law, trademark law, and contract law are at odds
when combined into the same dispute. No situation better illustrates such
inconsistency as the recent circuit split involving trademark licensees seeking to
retain their contractual rights against a bankrupt licensor who rejected the

Frank H. Easterbrook, JudialDiscretion in StatutoU Interpretaion,57 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (2004); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 1416 (1989); Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Role of OnginalIntent in Statutoy Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 59
(1988).
212Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376.
213Id at 377 (making analogies to the Uniform Commercial Code Article 2 and lessor/lessee
rights upon breach).
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original agreement. Of the three solutions examined in this Note, the most
recent solution offered in Sunbeam provides the best long-term solution to fairly
treat non-debtor trademark licensees.
Sunbeam reexamined the remedies
available under the Bankruptcy Code and focused on a contractual analysis that
allows the licensee to rely on terms of the trademark licensing agreement,
enabling the licensee to take advantage of remedies other than monetary
damages. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in a future case to resolve the
circuit split on the issue, it should affirm Sunbeam's contract law holding.
Sunbeam's holding avoids inequitable recession of rights bargained for by the
licensee, circumvents stare decisis problems for the Court regarding statutory
interpretation, and eliminates discrepancies among the many competing areas of
law by placing the burden on the parties to bargain as they see fit.
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